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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

]) Case No. 910372

JODIE DAHL,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

;

vs.

;

KERBS CONSTRUCTION CORP.,
and EPSTEIN CONSTRUCTION,
INC.,

]
Priority Classification
) No. 11

Defendants/Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred by
Section 78-2-2(3) (j), which gives the Supreme Court appellate
jurisdiction over orders of any court of record over which the
Court

of

Appeals

does

not

have

original

appellate

jurisdiction; and Rule 5, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
which

allows

the

Supreme

Court

discretion

to

interlocutory appeals.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issue presented for review is as follows:
Does the plain language of Sections
78-27-39 and 43, and Section 35-1-60,
Utah Code Annotated, as amended, prohibit
-1-

hear

inclusion of a non-party who cannot be
named as a defendant, on a special
verdict form for purposes of apportioning
fault?
Counsel agrees with Appellant Kerbs's statement of
the standard of review.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Sections 78-27-37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42 and 43, Utah
Code Annotated, as amended.

Sections 3 5-1-60 and 62, Utah

Code Annotated, as amended.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellee agrees with the Statement of the Case in
Appellant Kerbs's Brief.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Appellant Epstein Construction, Inc. (hereinafter
"Epstein")

was

remodelling

construction

project

at

manager

with

Albertsons'

respect

North

to

Salt

a

Lake

Distribution Center, which project included installation of
new

banana

storage

rooms

(R.,

at

2-3;

265).

Epstein

subcontracted with Appellant Kerbs Construction Corporation
(hereinafter "Kerbs") for work which included cutting a trench
in the concrete floor of the Distribution Center for purposes
of placing utility lines and the banana room walls (R. , at
266) .
Appellee Jodie Dahl was an employee of Albertsons
and,

on

February

14,

1989,

during

the

course

of

her

employment, fell backward over the trench, suffering serious
-2-

and permanent injuries, including a herniated disc and other
(R. , at 3).

physical complications•

Ms. Dahl received

workers compensation benefits for her injuries.

(R., at 3 ) .

Ms. Dahl filed suit for her injuries against Kerbs
and Epstein.

(R., at 1-4). Kerbs and Epstein alleged, inter

alia, comparative negligence on the part of Ms. Dahl and her
employer, Albertsons,

(R., at

13-17),

and

filed motions

seeking the inclusion of Albertsons on the special verdict
form.

(R. , at 565).

Judge Cornaby at first granted this

motion, but upon reconsideration, he reversed himself and
refused to permit the fault of Albertsons to be assessed
pursuant to Section 78-27-39, Utah Code Annotated, as amended.
(R., at 749-750). This interlocutory appeal followed, and the
trial in this case has been stayed pending the decision of
this appeal.

(R., at 978-979 and 982-983).

Appellee submits that these are the relevant facts
necessary to resolve this appeal, that the Statement of Facts
in Appellant Kerbs's Brief is unnecessarily long, and goes
more to the merits of the case than to the facts necessary to
resolve the appeal, and, accordingly, requests this Court to
disregard the lengthy Statement of Facts.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
There is no conflict between the plain language of
Utah's Comparative Negligence Statutes and the Utah's Worker's
Compensation

Act.

The

former

-3-

expressly

and

repeatedly

excludes employers from inclusion as parties defendant and
from inclusion on special verdict forms for purposes of fault
determination.

The Comparative Negligence Statutes also

expressly recognize the statutory immunity from liability of
employers under the Utah's Worker's Compensation Act.
By recognizing an employer's immunity from suit and
from apportionment of fault in the Comparative Fault statutes,
our

legislature has determined

that the

strong policies

underlying the Worker's Compensation Act merit the immunity
given to employers.

To adopt Appellants' position would not

only result in a judicial rewriting of these statutes, but
would undermine the purposes of the Worker's Compensation Act
and the manner in which employers function under it.

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF SECTIONS 78-27-39
AND 43, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, AS AMENDED,
PRECLUDES A NON-DEFENDANT FROM BEING
INCLUDED ON A SPECIAL VERDICT FORM FOR
PURPOSES OF APPOINTING FAULT.

Utah's Comparative Fault Statutes, Sections 78-27-37
through 43, Utah Code Annotated, as amended, set forth a
tightly worded

scheme by which the comparative fault of

defendants, and only defendants, may be assessed (emphasis
added). Section 78-27-37 defines a "defendant" as "any person
not immune from suit..." (emphasis added).

-4-

Section 78-27-38

provides

that no defendant

proportion

of

is liable

fault of that defendant

in excess

of the

(emphasis added).

Section 78-27-39 provides:
The trial court may, and when
requested by any party shall, direct the
jury, if any, to find separate special
verdicts determining the total amount of
damages sustained and the percentage or
proportion of fault attributable to each
person seeking recovery and to each
defendant, (emphasis added).
It is a general principle of statutory construction
that, unless technical terms are used, words employed in a
statute must be given their usual and ordinary meaning. Cache
Auto Co. v. Central Garage, 63 Utah 10, 221 P.862 (1923).

In

construing a statute, all words are presumed to have been used
advisedly.

Pate v. Marathon Steel Co. , 777 P. 2d 428 (Utah

1989) .
Appellants'

argue

that

there

is

some

form

of

inequity in the Comparative Fault Statutes and some perceived
conflict with the Worker's Compensation Act.

They concede

that the plain language of the Comparative Fault Statutes
limits special verdict forms to apportionment of fault among
plaintiff and defendants, but argue that this was not really
the intended result. However, "the best evidence of the true
intent and purpose of the Legislature in enacting the Act is
the plain language of the Act," Jensen v. Intermountain Health
Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903 (Utah 1984).
Section 35-1-60, Utah Code Annotated, as amended,
-5-

provides that ".•.no action at law may be maintained against
an employer... based upon any accident, injury or death of any
employee."

This immunity from suit is recognized explicitly

in Section 78-27-43, which provides:
Nothing in Sections 78-27-37 through
78-27-42 affects or impairs any common
law or statutory immunity from liability,
including, but not limited to... the
exclusive remedy provisions of Chapter 1,
Title 35...(emphasis added).
Thus, what our legislature has done in creating the
scheme of our Comparative Fault Statutes, is provide for
apportionment of fault among those persons or entities who can
be sued as defendants.

Liability is no longer joint and

several; it is apportioned.

But employers are excluded

expressly and repeatedly from this apportionment because of
the strong policies underlying the no-fault theory of worker's
compensation, as will be more fully argued under Point III
below.

Since Albertsons is immune from suit under Sections

78-27-43, and 35-1-60, it cannot be a defendant, and hence
cannot be included on a special verdict form.
Additionally, Section 78-27-41 provides:
A person seeking recovery, or any
defendant who is a party to the
litigation, may join as parties any
defendants who may have caused or
contributed to the injury or damage for
which recovery is sought, for the purpose
of having determined their respective
proportions of fault. (emphasis added).
Given this specific statute, if the Legislature had intended

-6-

to allow inclusion of immune employers on the special verdict
forms, it would have stated so explicitly.
Appellants rely principally on case law from Idaho
and Wisconsin, claiming that Utah's Comparative Fault Statute
is modeled after the statutory schemes of those states.
Utah's Comparative Negligence Act was adopted in 1973, and the
cases cited by Appellants from the other jurisdictions were
decided subsequent to that date [Beringer v. State, 727 P.2d
1222

(Idaho

1986)

(Kerbs's

Brief,

at

p.17);

Pocatello

Industrial Park Company v. Steel West. Inc., 101 Idaho 783,
621 P.2d 399 (1980) (Kerbs's Brief, at p. 16 and Epstein's
Brief

at

pp.10,13);

Connar

v. West

Shore

Equipment

of

Milwaukee, Inc., 227 N.W.2d 660 (Wis. 1975) (Epstein's Brief,
at p.9)].

However, in Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care,

Inc.. 679 P.2d 903 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court held
that the presumption that the Legislature intended to adopt
Idaho's judicial interpretations along with its Comparative
Negligence Statute, does not apply to Idaho court decisions
subsequent to the 1973 date of adoption.

679 P. 2d 903, at

905.
Furthermore, Utah's Comparative Negligence Act was
repealed in 1986, and replaced with the Liability Reform Act,
current Section 78-27-37 through 43.

Stephens v. Henderson,

741 P.2d 952 (Utah 1987). The Liability Reform Act's language
changed the wording concerning who could be included on

-7-

special verdict forms from determining the*negligence of "each
party" (language of the former Comparative Negligence Act) to
determining

"the

percentage

or

proportion

of

fault

attributable to... each defendant." By changing this wording,
the Legislature has evidenced

an intent to include only

plaintiffs and defendants on the special verdict form, and any
Idaho judicial interpretations may and should be disregarded.
Jensen, supra.
Other courts have interpreted their comparative
fault or negligence statutes in this manner.

In Warmbradt v.

Blanchard, 692 P.2d 1282 (Nev. 1984), the Nevada Supreme Court
observed that where the plain language of the comparative
negligence statute required apportioning liability "among the
defendants" and returning a special verdict indicating the
percentage of negligence . "attributable to each party", no
reference was made to the negligence of other possible persons
or entities.

The court held that the jury should not have

been instructed to consider the negligence of one who was
neither a defendant nor a party.
In Mihov v. Proulx, 113 N.H.698, 313 A.2d 723
(1973), the New Hampshire Supreme Court noted that their
statute spoke only in terms of actual defendants, and not in
terms of other tortfeasors who were potential defendants, but
immune because of a covenant not to sue.

This court held

that, under those circumstances, the defendant may not implead

-8-

a third party as codefendant for purposes of apportioning
liability. It is submitted that a tortfeasor who is protected
by a covenant not to sue is analogous to an employer granted
immunity by the Worker's Compensation Act.
In Kelly v. Carborundum Company, 453 A.2d 624 (Pa.
Super. 1982), the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held, in an
action by an employee against a third-party tortfeasor, that
the employer could not be joined either as an additional
defendant or as an involuntary plaintiff for purposes of
apportioning fault under Pennsylvania's Comparative Negligence
Act, which provided:
...[w]here
recovery
is allowed
against more than one defendant, each
defendant shall be liable for proportion
of the total dollar amount awarded as
damages in the ratio of the amount of his
causal negligence to the amount of causal
negligence attributed to all defendants
against whom recovery is allowed... 42
Pa.C.S.A. Section 7102. 453 A.2d 624, at
627.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court held:
Contrary
to
the
premise
for
appellant's argument, this statute does
not provide for apportionment among all
tortfeasors causally responsible for an
injury.
"It merely provides for
apportionment among those defendants
against whom recovery is allowed. There
is no suggestion in that statute that all
possible tortfeasors be brought into
court, and certainly no requirement that
this be done to achieve the purposes of
the act. The trier of fact is simply to
apportion liability on a percentage basis
among those defendants on the record
against whom recovery is allowed..."
-9-

[citation omitted].
We observed in
Heckendorn, and repeat here, that under
existing law, an employer is not a
defendant "against whom recovery is
allowed.11 453 A. 2d 624, at 627 (emphasis
added).
The Pennsylvania Superior Court had already held, in
Heckendorn v. Consolidated Rail Corporation, 293 Pa. Super
474, 439 A.2d 674 (1982), that an employer who accepts the
responsibility of providing worker's compensation benefits is
not a party whose negligence

is to be

included

in the

apportionment required by the Comparative Negligence Law. The
Kelly court then held:
It seems clear, therefore, that
substantive law precludes the joinder of
an
employer
for
the
purpose
of
determining fault in an action commenced
by an employee against a third person.
453 A.2d, 624, at 627.
This

reasoning

is

applicable

equally

to

Utah's

current

statutory scheme.
In Mills v. Brown, 735 P.2d 603 (Ore. 1987), .The
Oregon Supreme Court interpreted its comparative negligence
statute, which provided for special verdicts determining the
"degree of each party's fault expressed as a percentage of the
total fault attributable to all parties represented in the
action."

The court confined the determination to the actual

named parties, relying on the plain language of the Oregon
statute.
follow

In so holding, the Oregon Supreme Court declined to

the

reasoning

of

the

-10-

following

cases

cited

by

Appellants:

Connar v. West Shore Equipment of Milwaukee, 68

Wis.2d 42, 227 N.W.2d 660 (1975) (Epstein's Brief at p.9);
Pocatello Industrial Park Co. v. Steel West, Inc., 101 Idaho
783, 621 P.2d 399 (1980) (Kerbs's Brief at p. 16; Epstein's
Brief at pp. 10,13); Brown v. Keill, 224 Kan. 195, 580 P.2d 867
(1978) (Epstein's Brief at pp.11,15).
Most

of the cases cited

by Appellants

do not

actually support their position that Utah's statutes require
an immune employer's include on the special verdict form.
Appellants'

cited

cases

fall

into

the

following

five

categories:
(1)
expressly

directed

The statutory language being construed
the

inclusion

of

immune

employers:

Williams v. White Mountain Construction Company, 749 P.2d 423
(Colo. 1988), see excerpts from Section 13-21-111.5(1), 6A
C.R.S. (1987) in Addendum; Dietz v. General Electric Company,
821 P.2d 166 (Ariz. 1991), A.R.S. Section 12-2506, requiring
considering fault of "all persons who have contributed to the
alleged injury... regardless of whether the person was, or
could have been, named as a party to the suit..." and that
percentage of fault assessed against such "nonparties are used
only as a vehicle for accurately determining the fault of the
named parties..."; Leonard v. Johns Manville Sales Corp.. 305
S.E.2d 528 (N.C. 1983), N.C.G.S. 97-10.2 expressly allows for
inclusion of immune employer and permits employer to defend;

-11-

Clark v. Pacificorp. . 116 W a s h e d 804, 809 P.2d 176 (1991) ,
RCW 4.22.070:

"In all actions involving fault of more than

one entity, the trier of fact shall determine the percentage
of the total fault which is attributable to every entity which
caused the claimant's damages, including the claimant... third
party defendants... [and] entities immune from
(emphasis added).
construing

plain

liability."

In these cases, the various courts were
language

conspicuously

absent

from

and

different than the relevant Utah statutes.
(2)
disallowed

The

inclusion

statutory

of employers:

F.Supp. 508 (S.D. Ind. 1987).

language

expressly

Huber v. Henley,

656

In this case, the issue was

inclusion of a subdivision of the state, not otherwise immune,
but against which the statute of limitations had run.

The

relevant Indiana statute permitted joinder of a "nonparty" to
determine comparative fault. Indiana Code 34-4-2 (a) provided:
"Nonparty" means a person who is, or may
be, liable to the claimant in part or in
whole for the damages claimed but who has
not been joined in the action as a
defendant by the claimant.
A nonparty
shall not include the employer of the
claimant. (emphasis added).
(3)

Cases in which the decision did not deal

with the issue of inclusion of an employer:

Kirby Building

Systems v. Mineral Explorations, 704 P.2d 1266 (Wyo. 1985).
This was a business tort case, but in discussing the statutes,
the court noted that Wyoming's comparative negligence statute

-12-

allowed joinder of anyone against whom plaintiff could seek
judgment.

In Utah, this would not include an employer.
(4) Cases in which ambiguities in that state's

comparative negligence statute only were resolved by judicial
decisions

permitting

inclusion

of

discussion of the immunity issue:
Light Co.. 231 Kan. 441, 647 P.2d

an employer, without

a

Pape v. Kansas Power &
320

(1982);

Taylor v.

Delqarno, 100 N.M. 138, 667 P.2d 445 (1983); Hall v. ArcherDaniels-Midland

Co. , 142

111. App.3d

200, 491 N.E.2d

879

(1986).
(5)
employer's

fault,

Cases which allow consideration of an
but

different from Utah's:

with

statutory

language

greatly

Connar v. West Shore Equipment of

Milwaukee, Inc., 227 N.W.2d 660 (Wis. 1975); Bode v. Clark
Equipment Co., 719 P.2d 824 (Okla. 1986).
In none of the cited cases in Appellants' Briefs is
there a statutory scheme similar to Sections 78-27-37 through
43.

All of the Appellants' cited cases in (3) through (5) of

Appellee's five designated categories, dealt with the issue of
permitting third party claims of contribution from negligent
employers under state comparative negligence statutes.

As

noted by the Supreme Court of Colorado in Williams v. White
Mountain Construction Company, supra, the great majority does
not permit a claim for contribution against the employer:
... In states with statutory
schemes
similar to that of Colorado, the majority
-13-

rule is to prohibit such claims. This
rule fulfills the twin public policy
goals
of
speedy,
predictable
determination of job-related injuries and
a reluctance to create a judicial remedy
that
invades the province
of the
legislature. 749 P.2d 423, at 428.
In footnote 5 of Williams, the Colorado Supreme Court mentions
that this is the rule in the federal courts and in thirty-four
states.

See also, Annotation, Modern Status of Effect of

State Workmen's Compensation Act on Right of Third-Person
Tortfeasor to Contribution or Indemnity from Employer of
Injured or Killed Workman, 100 A.L.R.3d 350, 356-364 (1980).
Thus, the cases cited by Appellants are, largely,
distinguishable, and those few supporting their position are
clearly the minority viewpoint.

Even among those few, the

statutory scheme is different from Utah's.

Our legislature

did not intend the inclusion of employers on the special
verdict forms.

POINT II: APPELLEE'S
EMPLOYER'S
(ALBERTSONS)
IMMUNITY THROUGH WORKER'S COMPENSATION
PAYMENTS EXTENDS TO THE APPORTIONMENT OF
FAULT.

Ms. Dahl received worker's compensation benefits for
her injuries.

Nothing in Utah's Comparative Fault Statutes

"affects or impairs any... statutory immunity from liability,
including... the exclusive remedy provisions of Chapter 1,
Title 35." Section 78-27-43.
-14-

Section 35-1-60 provides:
The right to recover compensation
pursuant to the provisions of this title
for injuries sustained by an employee...
shall be the exclusive remedy against the
employer... and the liabilities of the
employer imposed by this act shall be in
place of any and all other civil
liability whatsoever.
See also, Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 777 P. 2d 428 (Utah
1989) . It is submitted that the Liability Reform Act of 1986
does not affect Albertson's immunity, and that this extends to
liability from apportionment of fault.
Courts of other states have so held.

In Cordier v.

Stetson-Ross, Inc.. 704 P.2d 86 (Mont. 1979), the Montana
Supreme Court followed the majority rule and held that an
employer, immune from liability under worker's compensation
statutes, is not liable to a third party for contribution.
The court relied on Montana's worker's compensation statutes,
which are similar to Utah's:
It is the intent and purpose of the
Worker's Compensation Act that the right
of action against a responsible third
party
belongs
to
the
employee.
Consequently, it is uniformly held that
the employer's contributory negligence
may not be used as a defense in an action
by the injured employee against the
responsible party...
Therefore, under the Montana scheme,
the negligence, if any, of the employer
(but not of the employee himself) never
becomes
an
issue
in
the
injured
employee's action against a responsible
third party.
His right to recover
damages is determined without reference
to his employer's negligence...
-15-

While
this
may
result
in
a
"negligent" employer profiting through
subrogation, the employee's cause of
action cannot be split.
In choosing
between two possible injustices, allowing
a negligent employer to profit, or
reducing the recovery allowed to an
injured employee, the Montana legislature
has opted in favor of the employee by
providing him full recovery.
604 P. 2d
86, at 93.
Another case with a similar holding is Correia v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 388 Mass. 342, 446 N.E.2d 1033
(1983). In Correia, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts had to
deal with an "equitable" solution proposed by the third-party
tortfeasor

to

the

supposed

contribution from the employer.

inequity

of

not

allowing

This proposed "equitable"

solution was similar to that suggested in the present case by
Appellants.

The Massachusetts Supreme Court held:

...Similar solutions have been proposed
without success in a number of other
states where the workmen's compensation
statutes have been construed to bar
contribution
against
the
employer
[citation omitted]. A common ground for
the
decisions
denying
equitable
solutions, aside from difficulties with
the solutions themselves, has been that
the workmen's compensation laws are
economic regulations representing the
Legislature's
balance
of
competing
societal interest and that the courts
have no place in reshaping public policy
in the face of such comprehensive
legislation [citations omitted].
We
accepted this rationale in Westerlind...
we think its rationale extends to
preclude our making any decision here in
the name of equity which would undercut
the
legislative
scheme... Workmen's
compensation is not an area so "long left
-16-

to the common law [that] change may come
about
by
the
same
medium
of
development... 446 N.E.2d 1033, at 10361037.
Other

cases

supporting

this

position

include:

Seattle First National Bank v. Shoreline Concrete, 588 P.2d
1308

(Wash.

1978);

Therrien

v.

Safeguard

Manufacturing

Company, 35 Conn. Supp. 268, 408 A.2d 273 (1979); Thompson v.
Stearns Chemical Corp.. 345 N.W.2d

131

(Iowa 1984); and

Gernand v. Ost Services. Inc., 298 N.W.2d 500 (N.D. 1980).

POINT III ADOPTION OF APPELLANTS' POSITION WOULD
UNDERMINE THE PURPOSES OF UTAH'S WORKER'S
COMPENSATION STATUTES.

Appellee's main argument is, as set forth in Point
I above, that the plain language of the relevant Utah statutes
precludes a "non-defendant" from being included on special
verdict forms.

Nonetheless, Appellants raise certain policy

arguments, most notably the feared "double recovery" of an
employee (Epstein's Brief, at pp.16-17).

This fear is not

only unfounded but, if anything, it is the employee who would
not recover fully and the employer who would benefit.
Appellant Epstein argues that under Utah's worker's
compensation benefits, an employee is reimbursed for most if
not all economic losses, e.g., lost wages.

Actually, as is

well known, employees may recover only up to two-thirds of
their lost wages, Section 3 5-1-65, to a maximum of 100 percent
-17-

of the state's average weekly wage. A similar limit is set on
permanent wage loss, Section 35-1-67.

There are limits of a

maximum of six years, and two-thirds wage loss on permanent
partial disability, Section 35-1-66, and two-thirds wage loss
on permanent total disability, Section 35-1-67.

An injured

worker does not recover any general damages for pain and
suffering.
only

An injured worker earning $1,000.00 per week can

recover

two-thirds

currently, on lost wages.

up

to

about

$2 3 7.00

per

week,

Regardless of the employer's or

worker's fault, the employer or its insurance carrier is
reimbursed dollar-for-dollar out of any third-party recovery
of the injured worker, Section 35-1-62.
This entire scheme is a considered
judgment.

legislative

The injured worker benefits by receiving a speedy

payment for his or her injuries. The worker does not have to
prove employer fault and, in fact, may often recover even if
the worker was at fault.

The worker does not have to go

through the protracted litigation process.

But the worker

does not receive the type or full amount of damages available
in an action at law against the employer.
On the other side, the employer benefits by paying
less than it would in a law action if it were at fault.

The

tradeoff is that the employer pays even if it is not at all at
fault.

As an overall benefit and tradeoff, the employer is

reimbursed out of the third party recovery.

-18-

Adoption of the Appellants' position would upset
this balancing of interests by the legislature.

The injured

employee would still have to reimburse the employer from his
or her third-party recovery, so it would be the employer who
benefitted by its own fault-based conduct, not the employee.
And the employer would be a phantom entity in the third party
litigation - its fault would be determined, but it would not
be there to assert its own position.

Neither would the

employer have any motivation to be involved in the third-party
suit.

The employer still is reimbursed, Section 35-1-62, and

there is no right of contribution, Section 78-27-40.

Thus,

adopting Appellants' policy argument would require not just
ignoring the plain language of Sections 78-27-37 through 43,
but a judicial rewriting of Section 35-1-62.
Addressing this issue, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, in Correia v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,
supra, observed:
As an example of the unfairness of
the rule
[of excessive plaintiff's
recovery],
Firestone
presents
the
scenario
of
a
third
party
whose
negligence contributed only one percent
to the employee's damages, nevertheless
having to pay full damages in the event
that the employee's negligence was no
greater than that of the third party.
While we consider such a result harsh, we
can conceive of instances where, under
the first three instructions suggested by
Firestone, an employee whose negligence
was minimal or nonexistent would be
denied recovery or receive substantially
less than he would have had he not
-19-

received
workmen's
compensation.
Moreover, we are not. so naive as to fail
to acknowledge that one of the practical
effects of Westerlind is to favor one
insurance
company
(the
employer's
carrier) over another insurance company
(the third party's carrier). 446 N.E.2d
1033, at 1036, n.5.
Since Utah's Worker's Compensation statutes are
premised on a no-fault concept, if an employer's right to
reimbursement under Section 35-1-62 were subject to a credit
or set-off for the employer's apportioned share of fault, the
employer

would

compensation

be

motivated

claim by showing

to

contest

the

worker's

fatult on the part of the

employee, so as to protect its right to reimbursement.
Finally, Epstein's position, at p.18 of its Brief,
that "a subrogee must not himself be at fault or contributing
to the loss on which he sues," is erroneous for two reasons.
First, since the employer is not and cannot be a party to the
third-party

tort

litigation,

it

is

not

bound

by

any

apportioned fault or any res judicata aspect of the judgment.
Second, the employer's right to reimbursement is based upon
statute, and fault has nothing to do with it, Section 35-162(2) .
CONCLUSION
Our

legislature

has

expressed

its

considered

decision in the Liability Reform and Worker's Compensation
Acts.

The plain language of the former shows that the

legislature intended that employers who are immune from suit,
-20-

because of worker's compensation payments, not be included on
the special verdict forms.

To allow their inclusion would

undermine the no-fault and other policies of the worker's
compensation statutes, and would amount to a rewriting of
those statutes, and the comparative fault statutes by the
judiciary.

Judge Cornaby's ruling should be affirmed, and

this Court should lift the stay on the trial date and remand
this case for trial.
Respectfully submitted this

day of April,

1992.

ttajfZ
IK).
James R. Hasenyager
Martin W. Custen
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN
2661 Washington Blvd., #202
Ogden, Utah 84401
Attorneys for Appellee
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
**********************

I hereby certify that on this

Q Vdj

day of

April, 1992, I caused four true and correct copies of the
foregoing Brief of Appellee to be served upon the following,
by placing copies thereof in the United States mail, postage
prepaid, addressed as follows:
Mr. Nelson L. Hayes
Mr. George T. Naegle
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
P.O. BOX 2465
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2465

-21-

Mr. Michael A. Katz
PURSER, OKAZAKI & BERRETT, P.C.
39 Post Office Place, #300
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-2104

MARTIN W. CUSTEN

-22-

ADDENDUM

ADDENDUM - A

[pMI(gHD V.
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUIfi
IN AND FOR THE

Jlt!'i

COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH

JODIE DAHL,
RULING ON MOTION

Plaintiff,

TO EXCLUDE ALBERTSONS

vs.

Civil No, 900746945
KERBS CONSTRUCTION, et al.,
Defendants.

The

plaintiff

has

special verdict form.

moved

to

exclude

Albertsons

from

the

The defendants oppose the motion.

On February 26, 1991, Epstein Construction moved the Court
to include Albertsons on the special verdict form.

On March 13,

1991,

motion.

Kerbs

Construction

Company

joined

in

that

On

March 13, 1991, the Court received Epstein's notice to submit
for decision.
reasoned
Since

and

the

The motion was supported by a brief that was well
supported by

plaintiff

law from both

apparently

was

not

Idaho and Wisconsin.
objecting

the

Court

granted the motion.
The rule of law involved has not been adjudicated in Utah.
Albertsons is not a party to the action and cannot be made one
because
majority

of

the

of

jurisdictions

special verdict
made a party.

Workman's

Compensation
would

exclude

law.

Apparently,

Albertsons

from

the
the

form because it is not a party and cannot be
On the other hand, Idaho and Wisconsin rule that

the fault of all persons contributing to an accident should "be
presented to the jury under comparative negligence law.
The plaintiff was not diligent in responding to defendants7
motion to include Albertsons.

Yet, the legal position of the

plaintiff appears more reasonable to the Court.

The defendants

point out that there is no such thing as a motion f0r
reconsideration in Utah. This rule works well when the Court
has made factual findings, but not so well when, as here, no one
is hurt by the application of the better reasoned law.
In spite of the Court's prior ruling, it now rules that
Albertsons shall be excluded from the special jury verdict.
Regardless of the outcome of the case, the plaintiff's attorney
is responsible for defendants' attorney fees in conjunction with
responding to the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration.
The plaintiff is directed to file a formal order with the
Court•
Dated June 27, 1991.
BY THE COURT:

'
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STATUTES

35-1-60. Exclusive remedy against employer, or officer,
agent or employee — Occupational disease excepted.
The right to recover compensation pursuant to the provisions of this title for
injuries sustained by an employee, whether resulting in death or not, shall be
the exclusive remedy against the employer and shall be the exclusive remedy
against any officer, agent or employee of the employer and the liabilities of
the employer imposed by this act shall be in place of any and all other civil
liability whatsoever, at common law or otherwise, to such employee or to his
spouse, widow, children, parents, dependents, next of kin, heirs, personal representatives, guardian, or any other person whomsoever, on account of any
accident or injury or death, in any way contracted, sustained, aggravated or
incurred by such employee in the course of or because of or arising out of his
employment, and no action at law may be maintained against an employer or
against any officer, agent or employee of the employer based upon any accident, injury or death of an employee. Nothing in this section, however, shall
prevent an employee (or his dependents) from filing a claim with the industrial commission of Utah for compensation in those cases within the provisions of the Utah Occupational Disease Disability Act, as amended.
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 76; C.L. 1917,
§ 3132; L. 1921, ch. 67, § 1; R.S. 1933 & C.
1943, 42-1-57; L. 1949, ch. 52, § L
Cross-References. — Employment of children, § 34-23-1 et seq.

78-27-37.

Utah Occupational Disease Disability Law,
§ 35-2-1 et seq.
Meaning of " t h i s act". — See the note under the same catchline following § 35-1-46.

Definitions.

As used in §§ 78-27-37 through 78-27-43:
(1) "Defendant" means any person not immune from suit who is
claimed to be liable because of fault to any person seeking recovery.
(2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of legal duty, act, or omission
proximately causing or contributing to injury or damages sustained by a
person seeking recovery, including, but not limited to, negligence in all
its degrees, contributory negligence, assumption of risk, strict liability,
breach of express or implied warranty of a product, products liability, and
misuse, modification or abuse of a product.
(3) "Person seeking recovery" means any person seeking damages or
reimbursement on its own behalf, oTon behalf of another for whom it is
authorized to act as legal representative.
History: C. 1953, 78-27-37, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 199, § I.
Repeals and Reenactmcnts. — Laws 1986.
ch. 1989, § 1 repeals former § 78-27-37, as en-

acted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § i. relating to
dimimshment of damages and assumption of
risk, and rccnacts the above section,

78-27-38.

Comparative

negligence.

o ^ n f a Ri Ue ° f a P reer CS ° V" S e frrk l mf i e r e C °dVeefr ey nSdh a " n o t a I o n G b a r recovery by that
£
J
, 7 W n° H^ W e°V e r " n^ d e f e n d « t or group of defendants whose
recL™I
°
°
' °
^ t is liable to any person seeking
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History: C. 1953, 78-27-38, e n a c t e d by L.
1986, c h . 199, § 2.
R e p e a l s a n d R e e n a c t m e n t s . — Laws 1986,
ch. 199, § 2 repeals former § 78-27-38, as enacted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 2, relating to
special verdicts, and reenacts the above section.

Cross-References. — Product Liability Act,
manufacturer or seller not liable if alteration
or modification of product after sale is substantial contributing cause of injury, § 78-15-5.
Skiers not to make claim against or recover
from ski area operator for injury resulting from
any inherent risk of skiing, § 78-27-53.

78-27-39. Separate special verdicts on total damages and
proportion of fault.
The trial court may, and when requested by any party shall, direct the jury,
if any, to find separate special verdicts determining the total amount of damages sustained and the percentage or proportion of fault attributable to each
person seeking recovery and to each defendant.
History: C. 1953, 78-27-39, e n a c t e d by L.
1986, ch. 199, § 3.
Repeals a n d R e e n a c t m e n t s . — Laws 1986,
ch. 199, § 3 repeals former § 78-27-39, as en-

acted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 3, relating to
contribution among joint tortfeasors, and reen-acts*the above section.

78-27-40. Amount of liability limited to proportion of fault
— No contribution.
Subject to § 78-27-38, the maximum amount for which a defendant may be
liable to any person seeking recovery is that percentage or proportion of the
damages equivalent to the percentage or proportion of fault attributed to that
defendant No defendant is entitled to contribution from any other person.
History: C. 1953, 78-27-40, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 199, § 4.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986,
ch. 199, § 4 repeals former § 78-27-40, as enacted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 4, relating to

settlement by a joint tortfeasor, and reenacts
the above section.
Cross-References. — Enforcement of contribution and reimbursement, Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 69(h).
Joint obligations, § 15-4-i et seq.

78-27-41. Joinder of defendants.
A person seeking recovery, or any defendant who is a party to the litigation,
may join as parties any defendants who may have caused or contributed to the
injury or damage for which recovery is sought, for the purpose of having
determined their respective proportions of fault
History: C. 1953, 78-27-41, e n a c t e d by L.
1986, ch. 199, § 5.
R e p e a l s and R e e n a c t m e n t s . — Laws 1986,
ch 199, § 5 repeals former § 78-27-41, as en-

acted by Laws 1973, ch 209 § 5, relating to
rights of contribution and indemnity, and reenacts the above section

78-27-42- Release to one defendant does not discharge
other defendants.
A release'given by a person seeking recovery to one or more defendants does
not discharge any other defendant unless the release so provides.
History: C. 1953, 78-27-42, enacted by L.
1986, clu 199, 5 6.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986,
ch. 199, § 6 repeals former § 78-27-42, as en-

acted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 6, relating to
release of joint tortfeasors and a reduction of
claim, and reenacts the above section,

78-27-43. Effect on immunity, exclusive remedy, indemnity, contribution.
Nothing in §§ 78-27-37 through 78-27-42 affects or impairs any common
law or statutory immunity from liability, including, but not IimitecLto *overnmental immunity as provided in Chapter 30, Title 63, and the exclusive
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History: C 1953, 78-27-43, enacted by L.
, 19?, § 9 provided "If any provision of
1986, ch- 199, 5 7.
§§ 78-27-37 through 78-27-43, or the applicaRepeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986,
tion of any provisions of those sections to any
ch. 199, § 7 repeals former § 78-27-43, as enacted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 7, relating to person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remaining provisions of those sections shall be
release of joint tortfeasors and contribution,
given effect without the invalid provision or
and reenacts the above section.
Severability Clauses. — Laws 1986. ch. application."

ADDENDUM - C

TITLE 13.

COURTS AND COURT PROCEDURE
DAMAGES
DAMAGES
ARTICLE 21. DAMAGES
PART 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS

C.R.S.
21-111.5.

13-21-111.5

(1991)

Civil liability cases - pro rata liability of defendants

1) In an action brought as a result of a death or an injury to person or
erty, no defendant shall be liable for an amount greater than that
esented by the degree or percentage of the negligence or fault attributable
uch defendant that produced the claimed injury, death, damage, or loss,
pt as provided in subsection (4) of this section.
2) The jury shall return a special verdict, or, in the absence of a jury,
court shall make special findings determining the percentage of negligence
ault attributable to each of the parties and any persons not parties to the
on of whom notice has been given pursuant to paragraph (b) of subsection (3)
.his section to whom some negligence or fault is found and determining the
il amount of damages sustained by each cLaimant. The entry of judgment shall
lade by the court based on the special findings, and no general verdict shall
returned by the jury.
;3) (a) Any provision of the law to the contrary notwithstanding, the finder
fact in a civil action may consider the degree or percentage of negligence or
Lt of a person not a party to the action, based upon evidence thereof, which
LI be admissible, in determining the degree or percentage of negligence or
Lt of those persons who are parties to such action. Any finding of a degree
percentage of fault or negligence of a nonparty shall not constitute a
sumptive or conclusive finding as to such nonparty for the purposes of a
Dr or subsequent action involving that nonparty.
(b) Negligence or fault of a nonparty may be considered if the claimant
ered into a settlement agreement with the nonparty or if the defending party
es notice that a nonparty was wholly or partially at fault within ninety days
lowing commencement of the action unless the court determines that a longer
iod is necessary. The notice shall be given by filing a pleading in the
ion designating such nonparty and setting forth such nonparty's name and
t-known address, or the best identification of such nonparty which is
sible under the circumstances, together with a brief statement of the basis
believing such nonparty to be at fault. Designation of a nonparty shall be
>ject to the provisions of section 13-17-102. If the designated nonparty is a
ensed health care professional and the defendant designating such nonparty
eges professional negligence by such nonparty, the requirements and
>cedures of section 13-20-602 shall apply.

